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The Uncertain Future of Water Rights in California:
Reflections on the Governor's Commission Report
Brian E. Gray*
I. INTRODUCTION
In the midst of the worst acute drought in California's recorded history,'
Governor Edmund G. Brown, Jr., created the Governor's Commission to Review
California Water Rights Law (the "Commission").2 The Commissioners, together
with their staff and technical advisors, comprised a luminous group of experts.
They included the recently retired Chief Justice of the California Supreme Court
(and author of one of the most important water rights opinions in the court's
history), the Dean of Stanford Law School (and one of the most respected
academic experts in the field of western water law), the Chairman of the State
Water Resources Control Board (and future C.E.O of one of California's largest
public utilities), the Director of the Department of Water Resources (now an
Associate Justice of the California Court of Appeal), the principal designer of the
State Water Project and other civil and water supply engineers, an array of
California water lawyers (among them the dean of the state's water bar), an
assortment of water managers and hydrologists, and a phalanx of young staff
attorneys (several of whom would go on to become influential water attorneys in
their own rights) led by the University of California's most distinguished
professor of water law. It was an impressive collection of expertise and talent.
Governor Brown asked the Commission to review and to evaluate California
water rights law, both in light of the stresses caused by the on-going drought and
in view of the policies embodied in Article X, Section 2 of the California
Constitution.3 The Commissioners directed their legal staff to prepare six reports
* Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings College of the Law; B.A., Pomona College; J.D.,
Boalt Hall School of Law, University of California at Berkeley.
1. During the 1976-77 drought, runoff in the Sacramento River basin was 37% of average, while runoff
in the San Joaquin River basin was 26% of average. See I DEP'T OF WATER RES., CALIFORNIA WATER PLAN
UPDATE 1998, at 3-7 (Bulletin 160-98).
2. See generally Cal. Exec. Order No. B-26-77 (May 11, 1977).
3. GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION TO REVIEW CALIFORNIA WATER RIGHTS LAW, FINAL REPORT 2 (Dec.
1978) [hereinafter FINAL REPORT]. Article X, Section 2, which was placed in the California Constitution by
initiative in 1928, provides:
It is hereby declared that because of the conditions prevailing in this State the general welfare
requires that the water resources of the State be put to beneficial use to the fullest extent of
which they are capable, and that the waste or unreasonable use or unreasonable method of use
of water be prevented, and that the conservation of such waters is to be exercised with a view
to the reasonable and beneficial use thereof in the interest of the people and for the public
welfare. The right to water or to the use or flow of water in or from any natural stream or water
course in this State is and shall be limited to such water as shall be reasonably required for the
beneficial use to be served, and such right does not and shall not extend to the waste or
unreasonable use or unreasonable method of use or unreasonable method of diversion of water.
Riparian rights in a stream or water course attach to, but to no more than so much of the flow
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on various aspects of California water rights law. 4 Based on these staff reports,
consultations with its technical advisors, and information obtained in a series of
public workshops and hearings, the Commission published its Final Report in
December of 1978. 5 The Final Report identified four areas of California water
law and administration that could be improved by legislative intervention. The
Commission urged the California Legislature to amend the Water Code in a
variety of ways to enhance the certainty of water rights, to improve the efficiency
of water use, to increase the statutory protection of instream uses, and to
authorize more effective regional management and adjudication of groundwater.
I. EFFICIENT USE, INSTREAM FLOWS, AND GROUNDWATER
Of the four sets of policy recommendations, only those on the subject of
water use efficiency were embraced by the legislature.6 In the two years
following the Final Report, for example, the legislature enacted a variety of
statutes that (verbatim in some instances) enacted the Commission's reform
proposals into law. These included: a declaration of "the established policy of
this state" that a water right holder's conformity with local custom shall not be
"solely determinative" of the reasonableness of the use under Article X, Section
2 of the Constitution;7 a finding that the conservation of water "shall be deemed
equivalent to a reasonable beneficial use of water to the extent of the cessation or
reduction in use;" 8 a determination that the "sale, lease, exchange, or transfer of
water or water rights, in itself, shall not constitute evidence of waste or
thereof as may be required or used consistently with this section, for the purposes for which
such lands are, or may be made adaptable, in view of such reasonable and beneficial uses;
provided, however, that nothing herein contained shall be construed as depriving any riparian
owner of the reasonable use of water of the stream to which the owner's land is riparian under
reasonable methods of diversion and use, or as depriving any appropriator of water to which
the appropriator is lawfully entitled. This section shall be self-executing, and the Legislature
may also enact laws in the furtherance of the policy in this section contained.
CAL. CONST. art. X, § 2.
4. See generally MARYBELLE D. ARCHIBALD, GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION TO REVIEW CALIFORNIA
WATER RIGHTS LAW, APPROPRIATIVE WATER RIGHTS IN CALIFORNIA (Staff Paper No. 1, May 1977); ANNE J.
SCHNEIDER, GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION TO REVIEW CALIFORNIA WATER RIGHTS LAW, GROUNDWATER
RIGHTS IN CALIFORNIA (Staff Paper No. 2, July 1977); CLIFFORD T. LEE, GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION TO
REVIEW CALIFORNIA WATER RIGHTS LAW, LEGAL ASPECTS OF WATER CONSERVATION IN CALIFORNIA (Staff
Paper No. 3, Aug. 1977); DAVID B. ANDERSON, GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION TO REVIEW CALIFORNIA WATER
RIGHTS LAW, RIPARIAN WATER RIGHTS IN CALIFORNIA (Staff Paper No. 4, Nov. 1977); CLIFFORD T. LEE,
GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION TO REVIEW CALIFORNIA WATER RIGHTS LAW, THE TRANSFER OF WATER RIGHTS
IN CALIFORNIA (Staff Paper No. 5, Dec. 1977) (hereinafter TRANSFER OF WATER RIGHTS]; ANNE J. SCHNEIDER,
GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION TO REVIEW CALIFORNIA WATER RIGHTS LAW, LEGAL ASPECTS OF INSTREAM
WATER USES IN CALIFORNIA (Staff Paper No. 6, Jan. 1978).
5. FINAL REPORT, supra note 3, at 2-5.
6. The Commission's proposed amendments to the Water Code are set forth in its Final Report. See id.
at 73-96.
7. CAL. WATER CODE § 100.5 (West Supp. 2004).
8. Id. § 1011(a).
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unreasonable use;" 9 a declaration of policy "to facilitate the voluntary transfer of
water and water rights consistent with the public welfare of the place of export
and the place of import;"' a detailed set of rules and procedures governing short-
term water transfers; l l and an enhancement of the State Water Resources Control
Board's administrative enforcement authority over permittees, licensees, and
unlawful diverters of water by creation of a "cease and desist" regulatory
program.12
In contrast, the legislature largely ignored the Commission's recommendations
on the remaining three subjects of its Final Report-protection of instream uses,
groundwater management, and certainty of water rights.
The Commission proposed two significant statutory additions to provide greater
protection for instream uses.' 3 It urged the legislature to direct the State Water
Resources Control Board ("SWRCB") to establish instream flow standards for the
state's rivers whenever the Board determined that such standards would be in the
public interest. 14 The Commission also recommended that the legislature recognize
instream water rights.15 These instream rights could be based on a new appropriation;
or the California Resources Agency could acquire an existing water right by gift,
exchange, or purchase, which the Agency would use for recreational uses or for the
benefit of fish and wildlife. 16
The Commission's groundwater reform proposals ran to eighty pages in its
Final Report. 17 One proposed statute would have directed the Department of
Water Resources ("DWR") to identify "groundwater management areas."' 8 This
proposal essentially would have divided California's groundwater basins into
discrete geographic components "based, to the extent practical, on the boundaries
of local entities concerned with the management of surface water or groundwater,
as well as geological and hydrological groundwater basin boundaries."' 9 The
Commission then recommended that the Legislature authorize the SWRCB to
designate an existing or newly created local governmental entity as the
Groundwater Management Authority ("GMA") for each management area.20
Each GMA would have significant management powers, including the authority
to regulate the storage of water in the basin, manage the conjunctive use of
9. Id. § 1244.
10. Id. § 109(a) (as amended).
11. Id. §§ 1725-1731 (as amended).
12. Id. §§ 1825-1851.
13. The Commission's proposed instream use recommendations may be found in its Final Report. See
FINAL REPORT, supra note 3, at 120-3 1.
14. Id. at 122.
15. Id. at 129.
16. Id.
17. See generally id. at 170-250.
18. See id. at 179.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 183-88.
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ground and surface water resources, buy and sell water and water rights, govern
the export of groundwater from the basin, regulate the extraction of groundwater,
and license the construction of new wells.2' A related proposal would have
empowered the board of supervisors of the county in which the greatest
percentage of a groundwater management area is located to create a Groundwater
Management District ("GMD").22 Modeled on the groundwater management
districts in Southern California, this proposed statute would have granted the
GMDs both the ground and surface water management powers described above
and the additional authority to levy real property taxes and "basin equity
assessments" to create incentives to protect against groundwater overdraft.23
A third statute proposed by the Commission would have changed the
substantive law applicable to groundwater adjudications. For overdrafted basins,
the Commission recommended that "rights to the use of the available supply...
shall be allocated primarily on the basis of recent use," although the court also
could consider other factors as appropriate "to avoid placing inequitable or undue
burdens on any party. ' 24 The dormant rights of overlying landowners-to the
extent not exercised at the time of the adjudication or preserved in a prior
declaratory judgment-would be extinguished.25  All groundwater users,
regardless of priority of right, would "share proportionately in any aggregate
reduction in extractions" required to bring total pumping within the safe yield of
the aquifer.26 Consistent with the California Supreme Court's decision in City of
27Los Angeles v. City of San Fernando, however, pueblo right holders and the
owners of groundwater imported into the basin would be exempt from this pro
rata allocation system.28
The instream use and groundwater recommendations were controversial and
ahead of their time. Popular support (at least as manifested in the legislature) for
enhanced protection of fish and wildlife, recreation, water quality, and other
instream beneficial uses of California's streams and rivers began to coalesce only
in the mid-1980s following Governor Jerry Brown's and Secretary of the Interior
Cecil Andrus' inclusion of five Northern California rivers in the National Wild
and Scenic Rivers system, 29 the voters' rejection of the Peripheral Canal, 30 and
21. Id. at 208-09.
22. Id. at 194-96.
23. Id. at 205-27.
24. Id. at 237.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 238.
27. 537 P.2d 1250 (Cal. 1975). The co-chair of the Commission, former Chief Justice Donald Wright,
was the author of the opinion of the court in this case.
28. FINAL REPORT, supra note 3, at 238. For groundwater basins that are not in a condition of long-term
overdraft, the Commission's proposal was simply to codify the existing hierarchy of water rights and the
allocation principles set forth in Katz v. Walkinshaw, 141 Cal. 116 (1903), City of Pasadena v. City of
Alhambra, 207 P.2d 17 (Cal. 1949), and City of Los Angeles v. City of San Fernando, 537 P.2d 1250 (Cal.
1975). See FINAL REPORT, supra note 3, at 239.
29. See County of Del Norte v. United States, 732 F.2d 1462 (9th Cir. 1984).
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the California Supreme Court's recognition of the public trust as a potential
limitation on the exercise of water rights in National Audubon Society v. Superior
Court.3' This trend continued into the late 1980s and early 1990s with the
California Court of Appeal's landmark Delta Water Cases decision, which
explicates the relationship between California's water rights and water quality
32laws, and its application of section 5937 of the Fish and Game Code to the
streams that feed Mono Lake in the Cal Trout litigation. 33 The federal
government joined the fray through the listing of the Sacramento River Winter
Run Chinook Salmon3 4 and the Delta Smelt35 for protection under the
Endangered Species Act36 (and the consequent changes in the operation of the
Central Valley Project and State Water Project3 7) and with EPA's 1991 veto of
California's water quality standards and its subsequent promulgation of federal
standards pursuant to section 303(c)(3) of the Clean Water Act.38 Public
recognition of the importance of instream flows, water quality, fisheries, and
other in situ uses of water was formally manifested in Congress' enactment of the
Central Valley Project Improvement Act of 199239 and the Bay-Delta Accord of
1994.40 Throughout most of this time, the California Legislature was content to
defer decisions on the subjects of stream flow standards and instream water rights
to the federal government and the other two branches of the state government.
Only in 1991 did the legislature finally adopt one of the Commission's
recommendations-albeit in more modest form-by authorizing the dedication
of water previously appropriated for consumptive use to the purposes of
"preserving or enhancing wetlands habitat, fish and wildlife resources, or
recreation in, or on, the water."41
The Commission's groundwater proposals have had a more checkered fate.
Although the legislature initially ignored all of the Commission's recommendations,
30. Cal. Proposition 8 (June 1982); see NORRIS HUNDLEY, JR., THE GREAT THIRST: CALIFORNIANS AND
WATER, 1770s-1990S, at 325-34 (2d ed., 2002).
31. 658 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1983).
32. United States v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 227 Cal. Rptr. 161 (Ct. App. 1986).
33. Cal. Trout, Inc. v. Superior Court, 266 Cal. Rptr. 788 (Ct. App. 1990); Cal. Trout, Inc. v. State Water
Res. Control Bd., 255 Cal. Rptr. 184 (Ct. App. 1989).
34. 55 Fed. Reg. 12,191 (Apr. 2, 1989) (listed as threatened); 59 Fed. Reg. 440 (Jan. 4, 1994) (listed as
endangered).
35. 58 Fed. Reg. 12,863 (Mar. 5, 1993) (listed as threatened).
36. 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 1531-1544 (West 2000).
37. NAT'L MARINE FISHERIES SERVICE, BIOLOGICAL OPINION FOR THE OPERATION OF THE FEDERAL
CENTRAL VALLEY PROJECT AND THE CALIFORNIA STATE WATER PROJECT (1993) (Winter-Run Chinook
Salmon); UNITED STATES FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE, BIOLOGICAL OPINION FOR THE OPERATION OF THE
FEDERAL CENTRAL VALLEY PROJECT AND THE CALIFORNIA STATE WATER PROJECT (1993) (Delta Smelt).
38. 60 Fed. Reg. 4664 (1995).
39. Pub. L. No. 102-575, 106 Stat. 4706 (1992).
40. Principles for Agreement on Bay-Delta Standards Between the State of California and the Federal
Government, 2 HASTINGS W.-Nw. J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 97 (1995) (reprint).
41. CAL. WATER CODE § 1707(a)(1) (West Supp. 2004).
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and there remain significant gaps and ambiguities in California's groundwater laws,42
the legislature did enact three laws that are consistent with one of the Commission's
principal goals-to foster regional and conjunctive management of ground and
surface water resources to prevent (and in some areas to correct) conditions of long-
term overdraft. As part of its 1984 area-of-origin legislation, the legislature declared
that "[n]o groundwater shall be pumped for export from within the combined
Sacramento and Delta-Central Sierra Basins... unless the pumping is in compliance
with a groundwater management plan" adopted by the county or counties with
jurisdiction over the groundwater basin.4 3 A second statute, enacted in 1992, applies
to surface water that is made available for transfer by increased pumping and use of
groundwater. 44 This statute requires such transfers to be "[c]onsistent with a
groundwater management plan adopted pursuant to state law for the affected area" or
approved by the water supply agency from which the water is transferred based on
the agency's finding that the transfer "will not create or contribute to conditions of
long-term overdraft. ''45 The legislature enacted this law in response to concerns that
"groundwater substitution transfers" to the 1991 Drought Water Bank caused or
exacerbated conditions of groundwater overdraft in the lower Sacramento River
basin.46
The third statute, also enacted in 1992, authorizes local agencies to adopt
groundwater management plans. 47 Consistent with the Commission's earlier
recommendations, Assembly Bill 3030 grants local groundwater management
agencies significant planning and regulatory authority-including the power to
adopt conjunctive use programs, to protect against groundwater pollution, to
monitor changes in the groundwater table, and to impose "equitable annual fees
and assessments for groundwater management based on the amount of
groundwater extracted from the ... basin. 48 The legislation also authorizes these
agencies "to limit or suspend extractions" if the agency determines that
42. As Norris Hundley, Jr., has observed:
Despite significant progress in [ground] water management in the Santa Clara Valley and in
parts of southern California the issue remains grave virtually everywhere .. and at the crisis
stage in the San Joaquin Valley. There planning is in a shambles, water is allocated on the basis
of location rather than need, and overdrawn basins in many locales frequently result in land
subsidence so serious that aquifers collapse and cannot be refilled.... The problem remains
essentially as described more than two decades ago by the Governor's Commission to Review
California Water Rights Law: "California's groundwater is usually available to any pumper,
public or private, who wants to extract it, regardless of the impact of extraction on neighboring
groundwater pumpers or on the general community."
HUNDLEY, supra note 30, at 530 (quoting FINAL REPORT, supra note 3, at 136).
43. CAL. WATER CODE § 1220(a) (West Supp. 2004).
44. Id. § 1745.10.
45. Id.
46. See Brian E. Gray, The Market and the Community: Lessons From California's Drought Water
Bank, I HASTINGS W.-Nw. J. ENvTL. L. & POL'Y 17, 18-20 (1994).
47. CAL. WATER CODE §§10750-10755.4 (West Supp. 2004).
48. Id. §§ 10753.8, 10754.2(a).
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"groundwater replenishment programs or other alternative sources of water
supply have proved insufficient or infeasible to lessen the demand for
groundwater.
49
The Commission's instream use and groundwater proposals also had little
influence with the courts.50 In 1979, for example, separate districts of the California
Court of Appeal held that neither the Department of Fish and Game nor private
parties were authorized to appropriate water for instream uses.5' And in its most
recent water rights decision, the California Supreme Court unanimously rejected the
argument that, in cases of long-term overdraft, responsibility for reducing aggregate
pumping to the safe yield of the aquifer should be based on principles of "equitable
apportionment."
52
The Commission's recommendations in the fourth policy area--certainty of
water rights-received perhaps the most interesting reaction from the three
branches of state government. As with the topics of instream use and
groundwater management, the legislature has largely ignored the Commission's
proposal to improve the certainty of water rights and water rights administration.
The SWRCB took the initiative and implemented two of the Commission's
recommendations without waiting for the legislature's imprimatur, however, and
the courts subsequently embraced these reforms.53 Indeed, the Commission's
greatest influence may have been its contributions to the California Supreme
Court's contemporary water law jurisprudence.
III. TOWARD GREATER CERTAINTY OF WATER RIGHTS
The Commission began its analysis by declaring that "relative uncertainty...
is the distinctive attribute of water rights and water law in California., 54 It then
observed that uncertainty has plagued the exercise and administration of
California water rights since the 19th Century and "was one of the major
problems identified by the Conservation Commission, whose recommendations
led to the adoption of the Water Commission Act of 1913 . 55 Although the
49. Id. § 10753.9(c).
50. This should not be seen as a mark of failure on the part of the Commission. In all of the cases
described in this paragraph, the courts based their decisions on the existing law-both statutory and common
law-which the Commission urged the legislature to change to address the deficiencies that the Commission
identified in its Final Report.
51. Cal. Trout v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 153 Cal. Rptr. 672, 674-75 (Ct. App. 1979); Fullerton v.
State Water Res. Control Bd., 153 Cal. Rptr. 518 (Ct. App. 1979). The Legislature's enactment of section 1707
of the Water Code in 1991 only partly modified these decisions. As noted above, section 1707 allows water
right holders to ask the SWRCB for permission to change the purpose of use from the existing use (e.g.,
municipal and industrial or agricultural water supply) to instream uses. See supra text accompanying note 41.
Section 1707 does not authorize new appropriations of water for instream uses, however.
52. City of Barstow v. Mojave Water Agency, 5 P.3d 853 (Cal. 2000).
53. See infra Part ll.
54. FINAL REPORT, supra note 3, at 16.
55. Id.
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permit and license system established by that legislation has enabled the state to
gain administrative control over much of the state's appropriated surface water,
the Commission identified three continuing sources of uncertainty: inadequate
recordation and quantification of other types of water rights; water rights that
contain an unspecified future use component; and the doctrine of reasonable use
set forth in Article X, Section 2 of the California Constitution.56 According to the
Commission, these uncertainties impair both state and regional administration of
water rights. "Lack of knowledge of water use by non-statutory right holders
[i.e., water rights that are not based on permits or licenses issued by the SWRCB]
affects decisions to grant permits, because the availability of water for
appropriation and the existence and extent of other beneficial uses of water are
uncertain. 57 Uncertainty also leads to "recurrent and costly litigation,"58 and it
can deter water transfers because potential purchasers need to know that the
seller has rights to the water offered for transfer and third parties must have
reasonable confidence that their interests will be protected during and after the
term of the transfer agreement.59
To address the problems associated with uncertainty of water rights, the
Commission proposed four substantive amendments to the Water Code. In
statutory adjudications, the SWRCB would have authority to adjudicate the rights
both to surface water and to "interconnected groundwater supplies the inclusion
of which is essential to a fair and effective determination of the rights to other
water of the stream system."6 In statutory adjudications, the trial court would be
required to relegate unexercised riparian rights to the lowest priority (i.e., below
that of existing appropriators and new appropriations commenced before the
activation of the dormant riparian right).61 Water right holders who fail to file
statements of diversion and use as required by section 5101 (i.e., riparians, pre-
1914 appropriators, users claiming under a prescriptive right, and other surface
water rights not based on a permit or license) would be subject to civil penalties
of up to $1,000 and lose the right to protest applications to appropriate water
before the SWRCB.62 Prescriptive rights to surface water would be prospectively
abolished, both vis-i-vis other water users and "as against the paramount interest
56. Id. at 17-21.
57. Id. at 22.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 25. One of the staff reports to the Commission explained:
An effective market system requires definite and certain property rights. Lack of security may
reduce investment in the resource by reducing the value of the right.... To the extent that the
existing water rights system creates property rights which are uncertain and inflexible, it
reduces the potential for water transfers.
TRANSFER OF WATER RIGHTS, supra note 4, at 11.
60. FINAL REPORT, supra note 3, at 33.
61. Id. at 38.
62. Id. at 45-46.
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of the people of the State. 63 Although the Commission had identified Article X,
Section 2 itself as a source of uncertainty, it did not recommend any changes to
the Constitution or to the California courts' interpretations of the doctrine of
reasonable use.
For the most part, the legislature spumed these proposals. Integrated adjudication
of surface and groundwater rights in statutory adjudications-perhaps the most
controversial of the Commission's recommendations-has not been on the
legislative agenda since 1971, when the legislature defined the Scott River system to
include "ground water supplies which are interconnected with the Scott River" and
authorized the statutory adjudication of both ground and surface water rights.64 Thus,
the legislature ignored the Commission's conclusion that the Scott River system is
not the only hydrologic basin where integrated water rights adjudication would be
"essential to the fair and effective determination of rights on the stream. '65
The legislature did address the third of the Commission's certainty proposals.
In 1983, it amended the statement of diversion and use requirements to increase
the penalty for willful misstatements from $500 to $1,000, but it rejected the
Commission's recommendation to penalize riparians, pre-1914 appropriators, or
other surface water right holders who fail to file statements of diversion and use
as required by existing law.66 There were no significant constitutional questions
associated with the Commission's proposed statutory amendment. The United
States Supreme Court has upheld, against both takings and due process
challenges, laws that require property rights holders to file periodic notices of
their continuing assertion and exercise of their rights, even where the penalty for
failure to file is forfeiture of the right. 67 The civil penalty for noncompliance
proposed by the Commission would easily have satisfied the constitutional
standard set forth in these cases.
On the other two recommendations, the legislature took no action. This may
have been the product of its long-standing unwillingness to extend state
regulatory authority to surface water right holders not subject to the SWRCB's
permit and license jurisdiction as established by the Water Commission Act of
1913. The legislature's inaction also may have been a result of the California
Supreme Court's decision to venture into the breach. In rapid succession, the
court exercised its authority under Article X, Section 2 of the Constitution and
63. Id. at 47.
64. CAL. WATER CODE § 2500.5(a) (West Supp. 2004).
65. FINAL REPORT, supra note 3, at 29.
66. See CAL. WATER CODE § 5107 (West Supp. 2004).
67. See United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84 (1985) (rejecting a due process challenge to the forfeiture of
an unpatented mining claim under a provision of the Federal Land Policy and Management Act that requires the
claim holder annually to file a notice of intent to continue working the claim); Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 454 U.S.
516 (1982) (upholding a state statute pursuant to which a severed mineral interest that had not been used for
twenty or more years automatically lapsed and reverted to the current surface owner of the property unless the
mineral owner filed a statement of claim in the county recorder's office within two years of the enactment of the
recording statute).
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adopted two of the Commission's remaining three recommendations to improve
the certainty of water rights.68
In 1979, in its review of the statutory adjudication decree in In re Waters of
Long Valley Creek Stream System,69 the court ruled that the SWRCB and the trial
court that enters the adjudication decree have the power:
to decide that an unexercised riparian claim loses its priority with respect
to all rights currently being exercised. Moreover, to the extent that an
unexercised riparian right may also create uncertainty with respect to
permits of appropriation that the Board may grant after the statutory
adjudication procedure is final, .... the Board may also determine that the
future riparian right shall have a lower priority than any uses of water it
authorizes before the riparian in fact attempts to exercise his right.70
The court thus adopted the Commission's proposal that in statutory adjudications
the trial court "shall quantify riparian rights.., and shall accord unexercised
riparian rights priorities lower than those it accords to active users of water if
necessary to secure the reasonable beneficial use of water within the meaning of
California Constitution, Article X, Section 2." '71
The following year, in People v. Shirokow, 72 the court held that nonriparian users
of surface water whose impoundments or diversions commenced after December 19,
1914 (the effective date of the Water Commission Act) may not claim prescriptive
rights vis-a-vis the state.73 Pursuant to section 1052 of the Water Code, the SWRCB
therefore has authority to enjoin such non-permitted, non-licensed uses of surface
water despite the defendant's claim that he or she has rights to the water based on
prescription.74 Although the court emphasized that its decision "will not result in the
destruction of all beneficial uses of water originally undertaken in reliance on
prescription," 75 Shirokow represented a significant step toward the Commission's
recommendation that "prescription ought to be abolished prospectively and.., the
recognition or regulation of existing prescriptive claims should await judicial
clarification.
76
68. See In re Waters of Long Valley Creek System, 599 P.2d 656 (Cal. 1979); People v. Shirokow, 605 P.2d
859 (Cal. 1980). In both cases, the court affirmed (for the most part) legal and policy decisions made by the SWRCB.
The SWRCB thus took the initiative to implement the Governor's Commission's recommendations without waiting for
additional legislative authorization.
69. 599 P.2d 656 (Cal. 1979).
70. Id. at 668-69.
71. FINAL REPORT, supra note 3, at 38.
72. 605 P.2d 859 (Cal. 1980).
73. Id. at 865-66.
74. Id. at 865.
75. Id. at 866.
76. FINAL REPORT, supra note 3, at 31.
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The California Supreme Court's opinions, both authored by the late Justice
Stanley Mosk, were replete with references to the Governor's Commission's Final
Report and were premised on the Commission's conclusion that the water rights in
question created uncertainty and therefore were destabilizing to the state's
administration of its water resources system. In Long Valley, for example, the court
observed that the continued recognition of dormant riparian rights following a
statutory adjudication would be inconsistent with the legislature's goal of
determining and quantifying "all rights in a stream system.., with the final decree
assuring certainty to the existing economy and reasonable predictability to the uses of
water in [the] system." 77 If a water user subject to the decree could activate a dormant
riparian at some point in the future and claim water at the highest priority in the
system, the "'expanded riparian use [would have] the potential to preempt an inferior
appropriative right where the supply [of] water originally was sufficient to satisfy
both uses.' 78 The court concluded that the:
pernicious effects of uncertainty provide strong support for the conclusions
of the Governor's Commission... that comprehensive determination of
water rights has salutary results because it (1) provides "valuable
information for water rights administration and for planning purposes," (2)
"prevents recurrent litigation and gives the certainty of official recognition to
private property rights," and (3) creates "the basis for the orderly control and
management of water on a stream."
79
The supreme court echoed this analysis in Shirokow. The SWRCB must have
the power to enjoin post-1914 nonriparian uses of surface water not authorized
by permit or license because the contrary conclusion
would substantially impair the board's ability to comply with the
legislative mandate that appropriations be consistent with the public
interest. For example, the salutary effects of the comprehensive system
of water rights administration would be imperiled if the board were
powerless to enjoin an adverse use of water which the board had
previously otherwise allocated, or desired to allocate, in the public
interest. Moreover, the board is hindered in its task by any uncertainty as
to the availability of water for appropriation. The problem is
compounded by nonsanctioned uses which make it difficult for the board
to determine whether the waters of the state are being put to beneficial
use for the greatest public benefit.80
77. In re Waters of Long Valley Creek Stream System, 599 P.2d 666, 665-66 (Cal. 1979) (emphasis in
original).
78. Id. at 666 n.10 (quoting FINAL REPORT, supra note 3, at 21).
79. Id. at 667.
80. Shirokow, 605 P.2d at 865-66 (citing inter alia FINAL REPORT, supra note 3, at 21-25).
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The court concluded its analysis by agreeing with the Commission that "'prescription
exacerbates the lack-of-knowledge problem which hinders effective planning,
management, and enforcement of water and water rights." 81
IV. A SCORECARD
All in all, it was not a bad record for the Commission-especially given the
complexities of California water law and the intractable controversies endemic to
efforts to reform the state's water policies. The legislature enacted most of the
Commission's recommendations on efficiency. Indeed, the early statutes that
declared it to be the policy of the state to promote conservation and water transfers-
as well as the legislature's adoption of specific rules and procedures to govern short-
term transfers-helped to usher in a sea change in water resources management that
has made conservation and transfers two of the cornerstones of modem California
water policy. The list of success stories is now an impressive one--extending from
the 1984 long-term transfer of 100,000 acre-feet annually ("afa") of conserved water
from the Imperial Irrigation District to the Metropolitan Water District;82 to the
panoply of short-term transfers that helped sustain farmers, industry, and domestic
users during the 1986-1992 drought;83 to the 2003 long-term agreement between the
Imperial Irrigation District and the San Diego Water Authority to transfer 200,000
afa of conserved agricultural water;84 to the ongoing efforts of the CALFED Bay-
Delta Program to create incentives to retire irrigated land in the drainage problem
area of the western San Joaquin Valley and to purchase water from voluntary sellers
for use in the Environmental Water Account.
85
Although the Legislature rejected most of the Commission's proposals to
improve the protection of instream uses, the Commission's Final Report drew
attention to the fact that fish and wildlife, water quality, whitewater recreation,
and other in situ beneficial uses of the state's rivers and lakes had been neglected
historically in favor of full exploitation of the available water for consumptive
uses. As noted above, the Commission's work set the stage for the environmental
revolution in California water policy that began in earnest in the early 1980s and
which continues to the present day. Similarly, while the Legislature generally has
been content not to wade into the politically sensitive area of state groundwater
management, it did incorporate many of the Commission's suggestions into
81. Id. at 866 n.12 (quoting FINAL REPORT, supra note 3, at 32).
82. See Kimberly Martin McMorrow & Jeffrey W. Schwarz, The Imperial Irrigation District-Metropolitan
Water District Water Transfer: A Case Study, in MARC REISNER & SARAH BATES, OASIS: REFORM OR REVOLUTION
FOR WESTERN WATER 149-65 (Island Press 1990).
83. See SHARING ScARcrrY: GAINERS AND LOSERS IN WATER MARKETING (Harold 0. Carter, Henry J.
Vaux, Jr. & Ann F. Scheuring, eds. 1994).
84. See U.S. Dep't of the Interior, Colorado River Quantification Agreement and Related Documents
(2003).
85. See CALFED BAY-DELTA PROGRAM, ENVIRONMENTAL WATER AccouNT FINAL EIS/EIR (JULY
2003 & JAN. 2004).
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Assembly Bill 3030, the legislation that authorizes local agencies to manage their
groundwater resources on a regional basis. 86 The Commission's focus on the
benefits of conjunctive management of ground and surface water resources also
contributed to the development of groundwater banks and other conjunctive use
programs, especially in the San Joaquin Valley.87
The Commission's recommendations on the subject of certainty of water rights
have had the most intriguing legacy. As described above, the Commission's
proposals on dormant riparian rights and prescription played a significant role in the
California Supreme Court's Long Valley and Shirokow opinions. But these were not
the only water rights cases decided by the court in the aftermath of the Governor's
Commission's work. The court issued two other important water rights decisions in
the early 1980s, and it was in these cases that the court revealed something that the
Commission had overlooked-that not all uncertainties are alike and that some of the
uncertainties that inhere in California water rights law are worth preserving.
V. Two CERTAINTIES
Although it made no legislative recommendations on the topic, the
Commission included in its analysis a critique of the doctrine of reasonable use.88
The Commission acknowledged that the reasonable use doctrine is both an
intrinsic component of all water rights and a mandate of Article X, Section 2 of
the California Constitution.89 Although the Constitution grants the legislature the
power to "enact laws in the furtherance of the policy'.' of reasonable use, the
Commission noted that the legislature has seldom exercised this authority and
instead has left the enforcement of Article X, Section 2 to the courts and to the
SWRCB. 9° In the Commission's judgment, this deference has been a significant
source of uncertainty, because "the reasonableness of a particular use of water
will vary with the facts and circumstances of each case. As in the case of the
riparian doctrine, what is at present a reasonable use of water may not be one in
the future." 91 The Commission concluded that this form of uncertainty
cast[s] a shadow over questionably reasonable uses of water. With
increased demand for water in general, changing ideas of what is
reasonable, and the vagaries of climate and other factors involved in the
ad hoc determination of reasonable use, the shadow of uncertainty may
92envelop increasing numbers of water uses.
86. A.B. 3030, 1991-92 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1992); see supra text accompanying notes 42-54.
87. See DEP'T OF WATER RES., CALIFORNIA'S GROUNDWATER UPDATE 2003 (Bulletin 118).
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While the Commission accurately characterized the nature and scope of the
reasonable use doctrine, and correctly concluded that Article X, Section 2 itself is
a source of significant uncertainty, its analysis ignored a critical distinction
between different types of uncertainties. Some uncertainties-those addressed in
Long Valley and Shirokow, for example-hinder the state's ability to administer
its water rights system to protect the general public interest in conservation,
efficiency, and protection of the natural environment. Other uncertainties-the
type that inhere in the reasonable use doctrine---enhance the state's authority to
accomplish these policies. It was the California Supreme Court, rather than the
Commission, that recognized this crucial distinction.
In 1980, a week before it decided Shirokow, the supreme court handed down
its decision in Environmental Defense Fund v. East Bay Municipal Utility
District.93 At issue was EDF's claim that East Bay MUD's contract with the
United States Bureau of Reclamation for water that the Bureau would divert at
Folsom Dam on the lower American River violated the reasonable use
requirement of Article X, Section 2, because the reduction in flows caused by the
diversions would injure fish and wildlife, recreational uses, and water quality.94
EDF argued that East Bay MUD should have been required to receive the water
from a point of diversion located downstream on the Sacramento River below its
confluence with the American.95 The supreme court held that EDF stated a valid
cause of action under Article X, Section 2 and was not required to exhaust
administrative remedies with the SWRCB before suing in court.96 The greater
significance of the court's decision, however, was its reaffirmation-in a case
that pitted a proposed consumptive use of water for municipal and industrial
supply against the state's interest in protecting fisheries, recreation, water quality,
and other instream beneficial uses-of California's expansive and dynamic
definition of reasonable use. Writing for a unanimous court, Justice William
Clark declared that "[t]he scope and technical complexity of issues concerning
water resource management are unequalled by virtually any other type of activity
presented to the courts. What constitutes reasonable water use is dependent upon
not only the entire circumstances presented but varies as the current situation
changes.97
93. 605 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1980).
94. Id. at 3-4.
95. Id. at 4.
96. Id. at 9-10.
97. Id. at 6 (emphasis added) (quoting Environmental Defense Fund v. East Bay Municipal Utility
District, 572 P.2d 1128, 1137 (Cal. 1977)). The court also quoted from its opinion in Juslin v. Marin Municipal
Water District, 429 P.2d 889, 894 (Cal. 1967), in which it explained that "what is a reasonable use of water
depends on the circumstances of each case, such an inquiry cannot be resolved in vacuo from statewide
considerations of transcendent importance."
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It is difficult to imagine a definition of water rights that introduces more
uncertainty than does the italicized sentence. The right to impound, divert, or use
water-indeed, the property right in water itself-is defined not simply by the
reasonableness of the water user's own practices, but also by reference to an
array of other relevant factors (including, for example, the user's access to
alternative sources of supply, its reasonable ability to conserve, competing
demands for water, and the effects of the diversion and use on the environment).
Moreover, the water user's rights may vary over time as the "current situation
changes"-for example, as hydrologic conditions change, as new demands are
added to the system, as water use technologies develop, as new scientific
information becomes available about the effects of the impoundment and
diversion of water on the ecosystem of the river, and as new species are listed for
protection under the Endangered Species Act. The uncertainties that are
associated with dormant riparian rights and non-permitted claims based on
prescription pale in comparison to this dynamic and relativistic conception of
water rights.
Three years later, the supreme court issued its landmark opinion in National
Audubon Society v. Superior Court,98 holding that the City of Los Angeles'
licenses to appropriate water from the Mono Basin may be reconsidered and
adjusted as required to protect the public trust in Mono Lake.99 In an opinion
written by Justice Jules Broussard, the Court unanimously concluded that the
public trust is an integral component of California water rights law.1°° Just as the
doctrine of reasonable use serves as an inherent limitation on the exercise of all
water rights, the court declared that the public trust doctrine "prevents any party
from acquiring a vested right to appropriate water in a manner harmful to the
interests protected by the public trust."10' Although the court noted that the state
98. 658 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1983).
99. Id. at 722-23. A long-recognized doctrine of California natural resources law, the public trust grants
the public certain rights in the navigable waters of the state. These rights include navigation, commerce, fishing,
boating, and other forms of water recreation. Id. at 718-20. More importantly, the doctrine also confers on the
public the right to preserve the navigable waters and adjacent lands embraced within the public ."in their natural
state, so that they may serve as ecological units for scientific study, as open space, and as environments which
provide food and habitat for birds and marine life, and which favorably affect the scenery and climate of the
area."' Id. at 719 (quoting Marks v. Whitney, 491 P.2d 374, 380 (Cal. 1971)). The supreme court's decision to
incorporate the public trust into California's water rights system was based on the work of a number of legal
scholars, including the staff director of the Governor's Commission. See Harrison Dunning, The Significance of
California's Public Trust Easement for California's Water Rights Law, 14 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 357 (1980).
100. National Audubon Society, 658 P.2d at 727-29. Justice Frank Richardson dissented from the court's
conclusion that the California public trust claimants are not required first to bring their claims to the SWRCB
before suing in court. Id. at 733-35 (Richardson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Otto Kaus
wrote a concurring opinion, which stated that he agreed with Justice Richardson on this question but was bound
by Environmental Defense Fund v. East Bay Municipal Utility District to join the majority's decision that the
courts have concurrent, original jurisdiction over public trust claims. Id. at 733 (Kaus, J., concurring). Both
Justices joined the opinion of the court on the definition of the public trust doctrine and its holding that the
public trust and the water rights systems form an integrated body of law.
101. Id.at727.
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has the power to authorize water right holders "to take water from flowing
streams and use that water in a distant part of the state, even though this taking
does not promote, and may unavoidably harm, the trust uses at the source
stream,' ' 0 2 it also ruled that these decisions could be reevaluated and revoked as
circumstances change:'
0 3
Once the state has approved an appropriation, the public trust imposes a duty
of continuing supervision over the taking and use of the appropriated water.
In exercising its sovereign power to allocate water resources in the public
interest, the state is not confined by past allocation decisions which may be
incorrect in light of current knowledge or inconsistent with current needs."14
The court concluded that "It]he state accordingly has the power to reconsider
allocation decisions even though those decisions were made after due consideration
of their effect on the public trust."
10 5
Read in tandem, Environmental Defense Fund and National Audubon express a
judicial policy preference that is seemingly at odds with the emphasis on certainty of
water rights that was the raison d'etre of the decisions in Long Valley and Shirokow.
Yet, there is a logic to the court's quest to minimize uncertainty in the latter cases and
its decision to foster (or at least to countenance) far greater uncertainty in the former.
The uncertainty produced by the persistence of dormant riparian rights and
claims to water based on prescription is harmful both to other water users and to the
state's supervisory authority over the water rights system, because new uses based on
these types of water rights may preempt existing beneficial uses, force a reallocation
of water, and do so outside the regulatory jurisdiction of the SWRCB. The only
parties that benefit from the continued recognition of dormant riparian and
prescriptive water rights are the holders of those rights.
In contrast, the uncertainty created, or exacerbated, by the supreme court's
expansive and flexible definitions of reasonable use and the public trust enhances
state supervisory power over the water rights system and ultimately promotes the
public interest by conferring on the courts and the SWRCB tools to require
reasonably efficient water use, to create incentives for water conservation, and to
promote more efficient allocation of developed water resources. It also enhances
the power of the courts and the Board to accommodate the rights of consumptive
water users and the general interest in protection of fish and wildlife, water
quality, and other instream beneficial uses of the rivers and lakes that are the
sources of the state's developed water supplies. Although the decisions in
Environmental Defense Fund and National Audubon unquestionably render water
rights less certain for the individual user, in the supreme court's judgment this
102. Id.
103. See id. at 728.
104. Id.
105. Id.
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uncertainty is outweighed by the benefits-to water users and the public alike-
produced by the express reservation of assertive and flexible state regulatory
power over the exercise of water rights based on reasonable use and the public
trust.
There is much to criticize in the California Supreme Court's water rights
jurisprudence in the years immediately following the Commission's Final Report.
For example, in Long Valley, the court overturned the SWRCB's decision to
extinguish unexercised riparian rights on the ground that such action might be in
violation of the express recognition of riparian rights-including the dormant
component of the right-in Article X, Section 2.1°6 Yet, by relegating
unexercised riparian rights to the lowest priority in water systems that are fully
appropriated, the court de facto extinguished the dormant rights. Following Long
Valley, a riparian who seeks to commence a new use of water must obtain
permission from the SWRCB; and, if the right is granted, the riparian's priority
will be below that of all existing water right holders. In other words, the riparian
will be no better off than if he or she were a new appropriator.
In Shirokow, although the court held that nonriparian, post-1914 surface
water appropriators cannot acquire prescriptive rights vis-t-vis the SWRCB's
regulatory jurisdiction, °7 it left open an array of questions. For example, in his
dissenting opinion, Justice Clark argued that the majority's decision was
inconsistent with "[n]umerous cases [that] have recognized and enforced
property rights by prescription in surface and subterranean streams based on
post-1913 conduct."' 10 8 In response, the majority asserted:
Our holding that the state is entitled to an injunction against defendant's
unauthorized diversion of water will not result in the destruction of all
beneficial uses of water originally undertaken in reliance on prescription.
The board's broad discretion to act on appropriation applications is not
unfettered; while it is true the issuance of permits depends on questions
of policy and judgment, the board may not arbitrarily and capriciously
reject an application. 109
Yet, the court did not explain how the SWRCB should evaluate permit
applications based on prior prescriptive use. Is the Board required to prefer such
an application over a competing application that seeks to initiate a new use of
water? If the SWRCB grants a prescriptive water right holder a permit, what is
the priority date-the date of the application, the date on which the user obtained
the prescriptive right, or the priority date of the water right holder whose rights
were prescripted? Nor did the court address the more fundamental question
106. See In re Waters of Long Valley Creek Stream System, 599 P.2d 656, 667-68 (Cal. 1979).
107. People v. Shirokow, 605 P.2d 859, 865-66 (Cal. 1980).
108. Id. at 871-72.
109. Id. at 866.
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whether, following Shirokow, a surface water user may obtain prescriptive rights
against another water right holder. And, if so, what would be the value of a
"private" prescriptive right that is not recognized by the state? The questions
raised by the Shirokow decision may have created more uncertainty than the
court resolved.' 10
The supreme court's Environmental Defense Fund and National Audubon
decisions also raise a variety of significant questions. If, for example, the
determination whether the exercise of a water right is reasonable "depend[s]
upon not only the entire circumstances presented but varies as the current
situation changes," '' what are the relevant circumstances? As the Court later
inquired (without providing an answer) in National Audubon: "The dispute
centers on the test of unreasonable use--does it refer only to inordinate and
wasteful use of water ... or to any use less than the optimum allocation of
water?"'" 2 It would be helpful for water users to know the criteria by which the
exercise of their water rights will be judged.
Similarly, in its incorporation of the public trust doctrine into the water rights
system in National Audubon, the court clearly stated that the law "prevents any
party from acquiring a vested right to appropriate water in a manner harmful to
the interests protected by the public trust," ' 3 but it did not explain how a
particular water use should be evaluated to determine whether it is consistent
with the public trust. Indeed, the court articulated five potentially different
standards of review of public trust claims, including a feasibility criterion, a
public interest test, a rough form of cost-benefit analysis, a balancing approach,
110. Since Shirokow, two surface water rights decisions have addressed some of these questions. In
Pleasant Valley Canal Co. v. Borror, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 1 (Ct. App. 1998), the California Court of Appeal
assumed, without deciding, that a private water user may assert prescriptive rights against another private water
user. In In re Waters of the San Gregorio Creek Stream System, No. 355792 (San Mateo Super. Ct. filed Apr.
28, 1992) (Order Regarding Post-1913/14 Prescriptive Rights), San Mateo County Superior Court Judge Harlan
Veal ruled that prescriptive rights may not be asserted in a statutory adjudication. The judge based his
conclusion primarily on two provisions of the Water Commission Act of 1913:
(1) Section l(c) of the Act, now codified at CAL. WATER CODE § 1225, which provides that
"no right to appropriate or use water subject to appropriation shall be initiated or
acquired except upon compliance with" the permit and license requirements of the Act;
and
(2) Section 25 of the Act, now codified at CAL. WATER CODE § 2501, which authorizes the
statutory adjudication of "all rights to water of a stream system, whether based upon
appropriation, riparian right, or other basis of right."
Judge Veal reasoned that all water for which a prescriptive right is claimed is water that is "subject to
appropriation" within the meaning of section 1225 and therefore no one may acquire a right in such water
without obtaining a permit or license from the SWRCB. The judge also argued that the Legislature's failure to
mention prescriptive rights explicitly in section 2501 indicated that it did not intend to allow for the assertion of
prescriptive rights in statutory adjudications.
111. Envtl. Defense Fund v. East Bay Mun. Utility Dist., 605 P.2d 1, 6 (Cal. 1980).
112. Nat'l Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709, 728 n.28 (Cal. 1983) (citing Peabody v. City
of Vallejo, 40 P.2d 486 (Cal. 1935), and Joslin v. Marin Municipal Water District, 429 P.2d 889 (Cal. 1967)).
113. Id. at727.
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and a purely "considerational" requirement analogous to a NEPA or CEQA
analysis of reasonable alternatives. 114
As with the doctrine of reasonable use, accommodation of the various
interests in public trust cases entails difficult legal and policy questions that
center on the relationship between the public interest in supplying the state's
consumptive demands for water (which includes both the exercise of water rights
for this purpose and recognition of the property right in water) and the public
interest in protecting California's natural resources from undue degradation. Yet,
the court provided scant guidance on how the SWRCB, the courts, and members
of the water-use community should go about reconciling the competing policies.
In his opinion for the court, Justice Broussard did say that, under Article X,
Section 2, "[a]ll uses of water, including public trust uses, must now conform to
the standard of reasonable use."' 15 But this declaration simply compounds the
uncertainties of the reasonable use calculus by injecting into it the uncertainties
associated with "reasonable" protection of the public trust.
It is therefore not surprising that Environmental Defense Fund and National
Audubon have garnered their share of criticisms. Water users fear the specter of
state-sponsored reevaluation of what they previously thought were "vested"
water rights. Economists argue that uncertain definition of water rights deters
investment and undermines California's water transfer policies.1l6 Property right
advocates believe that the flexible and dynamic definition of water rights
embodied in the California Supreme Court's reasonable use and public trust
114. Id. at 727-29. As characterized by the Court, the alternative standards are:
1. Feasibility Criterion: "The state has an affirmative duty to take the public trust into
account in the planning and allocation of water resources, and to protect public trust uses
whenever feasible." Id. at 728.
2. Public Interest Test: "As a matter of practical necessity the state may have to approve
appropriations despite foreseeable harm to public trust uses. In so doing, however, the
state must bear in mind its duty as trustee to consider the effect of the taking on the
public trust ... and to preserve, so far as consistent with the public interest, the uses
protected by the trust." Id.
3. Cost-Benefit Analysis: "This is not a case in which the Legislature, the Water Board, or
any judicial body has determined that the needs of Los Angeles outweigh the needs of
the Mono Basin, that the benefit gained is worth the price." Id.
4. Balancing of Interests: "Neither has any responsible body determined whether some
lesser taking would better balance the diverse interests." Id.
5. Consideration of the Relevant Factors: "We recognize the substantial concerns voiced
by Los Angeles-the city's need for water, its reliance upon the 1940 board decision, the
cost both in terms of money and environmental impact of obtaining water elsewhere.
Such concerns must enter into any allocation decision. We hold only that they do not
preclude a reconsideration and reallocation which also takes into account the impact of
water diversion on the Mono Lake environment." Id. at 729.
115. Id. at 725.
116. See, e.g., BRENT M. HADDAD, RIVERS OF GOLD: DESIGNING MARKETS TO ALLOCATE WATER IN
CALIFORNIA 41 (2000) ("If current owners of water rights do not have secure rights-even if the lack of
security serves perfectly valid public purposes-they will have a difficult time finding buyers for those
rights.").
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decisions alter the property right in water and violate the United States Supreme
Court's admonition that "a State, by ipse dixit, may not transform private
property into public property without compensation."' 1 7 In the words of one of
the hosts of this symposium:
It is difficult to conceptualize a more fundamental departure from stare
decisis and traditional rules of property than evidenced by the
[reasonable use and public trust] decisions. California law has truly
moved into an era where water use is viewed as a government granted
privilege to be monitored by the SWRCB and the courts and, when
necessary, reallocated among competing users to achieve the greatest
social good.
11 8
VI. THE SALUTARY EFFECTS OF UNCERTAINTY
Despite these criticisms-and notwithstanding the court's sometimes
maddening lack of specificity-it is my firm belief that the California Supreme
Court got the essentials correct in the Long Valley, Shirokow, Environmental
Defense Fund, and National Audubon series of cases. In these decisions, the
court took steps to minimize the deleterious form of water rights uncertainty
while fostering the beneficial uncertainties that inhere in the doctrines of
reasonable use and the public trust. These doctrines-to a greater extent than any
other aspect of California water right law-have been the catalyst of some of the
most important policy reform initiatives in the past quarter century. Indeed,
uncertainty of water rights has contributed to the constructive resolution (at least
to date) of the state's two largest and most important water controversies.
A. Uncertainty as an Inducement to More Efficient Use and Allocation
In 1984, the SWRCB concluded that the Imperial Irrigation District's ("ID")
lack of regulating reservoirs and excessive deliveries of water to farmers
produced unreasonable amounts of return flow, which ran off the farmers' land
into the Salton Sea and flooded adjacent land." 9 The Board ruled that lID's
failure to implement "practical measures available to reduce the present losses of
water within the District... is unreasonable and constitutes a misuse of water
under [A]rticle X, [S]ection 2 of the California Constitution.' ' ° In its decision
affirming the SWRCB's statutory authority to apply the reasonable use doctrine
to lID' s water rights, the court of appeal relied heavily on Long Valley, Shirokow,
117. Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 164 (1980).
118. Clifford W. Schulz & Gregory S. Weber, Changing Judicial Attitudes Toward Property Rights in
California Water Resources: From Vested Rights to Utilitarian Reallocations, 19 PAC. L.J. 1031, 1110 (1988).
119. S.W.R.C.B., Decision 1600, at 66 (1984).
120. Id.
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Environmental Defense Fund, and National Audubon.121 It concluded that these
cases "establish all-encompassing adjudicatory authority in the SWRCB on
matters of water resource management," which "includes the power to adjudicate
the [A]rticle X, [S]ection 2, issue of unreasonable use of water by IID.'' 22 Two
years later, with its water rights in jeopardy of reduction based on the SWRCB's
finding of waste and unreasonable use, lID agreed to line its canals, construct
regulating reservoirs, and take other actions to conserve 106,000 acre feet
annually and to transfer the conserved water to the Metropolitan Water District(,,4MW3D"). 12 3
Two decades later, the threat of loss of additional rights-this time by order
of Secretary of the Interior Gale Norton-induced HID to agree to additional
conservation measures. In 2003, following years of scrutiny of California's
excessive use of water from the Colorado River, the Lower Colorado Regional
Director of the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation made a formal finding that farmers
within the TmD were wasting water. Based on this finding, the director determined
that ID was in violation of the beneficial use requirement of federal reclamation
law, 124 as well as regulations governing deliveries of project water from the
Colorado River. 125 He ordered a reduction in water deliveries by approximately
121. Imperial Irrigation Dist. v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 231 Cal. Rptr. 283 (Ct. App. 1986).
122. Id. at 288, 290. The court of appeal remanded to the superior court for a determination as to
whether the SWRCB's Decision 1600 was supported by substantial evidence. Both the superior court and the
court of appeal subsequently affirmed the Board's findings and conclusions in all respects. See Imperial
Irrigation Dist. v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 275 Cal. Rptr. 250 (Ct. App. 1990). In rejecting the District's
claim that the SWRCB's action violated its vested water rights, the court of appeal stated:
Put simply, EID does not have the vested rights which it alleges. It has only vested rights to the
'reasonable' use of water. It has no right to waste or misuse water. The interference by the
Board with ED's misuse (this finding of fact by the Board being accepted for purposes of the
present issue) does not constitute a transgression on a vested right.
id. at 261.
123. See McMorrow & Schwarz, supra note 82, at 149-65.
124. Section 8 of the Reclamation Act of 1902 provides: "The right to the use of water acquired under
the provisions of this Act shall be appurtenant to the land irrigated, and beneficial use shall be the basis, the
measure, and the limit of the right." 43 U.S.C.A. § 372 (West 2000). The Ninth Circuit has interpreted the
federal requirement of beneficial use to include a reasonable use component:
There are two qualifications to what might be termed the general rule that water is beneficially
used (in an accepted type of use such as irrigation) when it is usefully employed by the
appropriator. First, the use cannot include any element of "waste" which, among other things,
precludes unreasonable transmission loss and use of cost-ineffective methods. Second, and
often overlapping, the use cannot be "unreasonable" considering alternative uses of the water.
United States v. Alpine Land & Reservoir Co., 697 F.2d 851, 854 (9th Cir. 1982); see United States v. Clifford
Marley Family Trust, 354 F.3d 1154, 1163-64 (9th Cir. 2004).
125. These regulations require the Regional Director to make an annual recommendation "relating to
water conservation measures and operating practices in the diversion, delivery, distribution and use of Colorado
River water," and to determine "each Contractor's estimated water requirements for the ensuing calendar year
to the end that deliveries of Colorado River water to each Contractor will not exceed those reasonably required
for beneficial use under the respective Boulder Canyon Project Act contract or other authorization for use of
Colorado River water." 43 C.F.R. § 417.2 (2003).
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eight percent to 2,835,500 acre feet.' 26 This decision broke a decade-long
deadlock in negotiations among the Department of the Interior, DD, the MWD,
and the San Diego County Water Authority (which is a member agency of the
MWD). Two months later, Secretary Norton announced that the Southern
California water agencies had agreed to reduce their demands from the Colorado
River by 800,000 afa over the next fourteen years to bring California within the
4.4 million afa limits of the Boulder Canyon Project Act and that ID had agreed
to a long-term transfer of up to 277,000 afa of conserved water to San Diego.
127
In both of these cases, III) was found to be engaged in the unreasonable use of
water because its conveyance and irrigation practices were wasteful and were
causing harm to third-parties-flooding in 1984 and excessive demands on an
overstressed resource in 2003. In both cases, the state and federal authorities applied
the doctrine of reasonable use aggressively, but flexibly, to give lID and its members
a choice: either forfeit their water rights to the extent of unreasonable use or correct
the problem and benefit economically from the conservation and transfer of their
previously wasteful practices. Application of the reasonable use doctrine in this
context thus served three salutary purposes: (1) it induced the conservation and more
efficient conveyance and use of water within the DID; (2) it led to the transfer of the
conserved water to higher-valued uses within the MWD, thereby increasing the
efficiency of the allocation of this water; and (3) it reduced MWD's long-term
demands for water from other sources-such as the Sacramento-San Joaquin River
Delta or new water projects in the Sierra Nevada-and thus contributed to the
protection and preservation of California's natural resources.
B. Uncertainty as an Incentive to Accommodation of Interests and Balanced
Water Use
In 1986, the court of appeal reviewed the SWRCB's 1978 water quality
standards for the Bay-Delta Estuary 128 and its accompanying water rights
decision that adjusted the permits of the Central Valley Project and the State
Water Project to require the projects to release water, and to adjust the timing of
their exports from the Delta, to comply with the Board's water quality
standards. 129 The court, building on the supreme court's reasonable use and
public trust jurisprudence, confirmed the authority of the SWRCB to alter the
water rights of the two projects, as well as those of other users who divert and
export water from the Sacramento-San Joaquin River system, to protect fisheries,
126. Press Release, Bureau of Reclamation, Bureau of Reclamation Issues Regional Director's Final
Beneficial Use Determination for Imperial Irrigation District (Aug. 29, 2003) (copy on file with the McGeorge
Law Review).
127. See Dean E. Murphy, Agreement in West Will Send Farms' Water to Urban Areas, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 17, 2003, at Al.
128. STATE WATER RESOURCES CONTROL BOARD, WATER QUALITY CONTROL PLAN: SACRAMENTO-
SAN JOAQUIN DELTA AND SUISUN MARSH (Aug. 1978).
129. See S.W.R.C.B., DECISION 1485, at 17-18 (Aug. 1978).
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water quality, and other beneficial uses in the Delta.130 The court quoted the
supreme court's wide-ranging and dynamic articulation of the doctrine of
reasonable use in Environmental Defense Fund and explained that in the present
case "the Board determined that changed circumstances revealed in new
information about the adverse effects of the projects upon the Delta necessitated
revised water quality standards."' 31 Based on this new information, the court held
that the SWRCB "had the authority to modify the projects' permits to curtail
their use of water on the ground that the projects' use and diversion of the water
had become unreasonable.' 32 The court observed that "some accommodation
must be reached concerning the major public interests at stake: the quality of
valuable water resources and transport of adequate supplies for needs
southward."' 133 The ultimate decision of reasonable use, however, "is essentially a
policy judgment requiring a balancing of the competing public interests, one the
Board is uniquely qualified to make in view of its special knowledge and
expertise and its combined statewide responsibility to allocate the rights to, and
to control the quality of, state water resources."' 34 It concluded that "the Board's
power to prevent unreasonable methods of use should be broadly interpreted to
enable the Board to strike the proper balance between the interests in water
quality and project activities in order to objectively determine whether a
reasonable method of use is manifested."' 135 The court added that, although
National Audubon had not been decided when the SWRCB promulgated the
Delta water quality standards and water rights decision, "the Board's evaluation
process was not only a valid exercise of its reserved jurisdiction but also, in
retrospect, a proper exercise of its public trust authority as confirmed by our high
court." 13 6 Moreover, in its next round of Bay-Delta hearings, "the Board will be
guided by the principles discussed in National Audubon and may consider
whether a higher level of protection is necessary and reasonable."' 137 The
"principles set out under National Audubon," the court concluded, "confirm the
Board's power and duty to reopen the permits to protect fish and wildlife
'whenever feasible,' even without a reservation of jurisdiction.' ' 38
The court of appeal's opinion in the Delta Water Cases confirmed the
responsibility of the SWRCB to ensure that the diversion and export of water
from California's largest river system to supply consumptive uses throughout the
state do not jeopardize the fish and wildlife, water quality, and other instream
130. United States v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 227 Cal. Rptr. 161 (Ct. App. 1986) [hereinafter
Delta Water Cases].
131. Id. at 187.
132. Id. (emphasis added).
133. Id. at 188.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 202.
137. Id.
138. Id.
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beneficial uses that also depend on that system. The court's application of the
expansive definition of reasonable use and the public trust demonstrated that
these doctrines may serve as powerful forces of reform of water projects that
have become imbalanced over time by their one-sided focus on development of
the resource. The Delta Water Cases decision thus established a legal and
intellectual foundation for the succession of environmental changes that swept
over the Sacramento-San Joaquin River and Delta ecosystem during the late
1980s and 1990s including:
(1) the more comprehensive Bay-Delta hearings conducted by the SWRCB
that in 1987 began the long process of providing greater protection for fish,
water quality, and other in situ beneficial uses of water, and more fairly
apportioned responsibility for the achievement of these improvements in
environmental quality; 1
39
(2) the listing and protection of the Sacramento River Winter-Run Chinook
Salmon, the Delta Smelt, and other species of fish that migrate through or
inhabit the waters of the Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta under the
Endangered Species Act;'
4°
(3) the Environmental Protection Agency's 1991 veto of California's water
quality standards and its subsequent promulgation of federal standards
pursuant to section 303(c)(3) of the Clean Water Act;14'
(4) Congress' enactment of the Central Valley Project Improvement Act of
1992 (CVPIA), which inter alia authorizes the operation of the CVP for
139. See S.W.R.C.B., DEcISION 1630, at 85 (Dec. 1992) (draft). This draft decision proposed to establish
water quality, temperature, and flow standards for the Bay-Delta Estuary to protect Sacramento River Winter-
Run Chinook Salmon and the Delta Smelt, and it would have directed the CVP and the SWP to release water
and delay later project operations to protect these species during spawning and migration. Id. at 55-56. The
decision also would have required the operators of the 100 largest reservoirs in the Sacramento-San Joaquin
River system to release "pulse flows" to facilitate the migration of anadromous fish. Id. at 57. In addition, the
SWRCB announced a "mitigation fee" applicable to the major surface water users in the system. For export
users, the proposed fees were $15 per acre foot for municipal and industrial use and $3 per acre foot for
agricultural use. For in-basin users, the proposed fees were $10 per acre foot for municipal and industrial use
and $2 per acre foot for agricultural use. Id. at 144. On orders from Governor Pete Wilson, the SWRCB
withdrew this draft decision on April 1, 1993. See Dean E. Murphy, Politics Once Again Dry Up Water Reform
Policy, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 5, 1993, at A3.
140. Four species of fish that inhabit or pass through the Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta have been listed
for protection under the Endangered Species Act. These are: the Sacramento River Winter Run Chinook
Salmon, which was listed as threatened in 1989, 55 Fed. Reg. 12,191 (Apr. 2, 1989), and as endangered in 1994,
59 Fed. Reg. 440 (Jan. 4, 1994); the Delta Smelt, which was listed as threatened in 1993, 58 Fed. Reg. 12,863
(Mar. 5, 1993); the Sacramento Splittail, which the United States Fish and Wildlife Service listed as a
threatened species in 1999, 64 Fed. Reg. 5963 (Feb. 8, 1999), and then delisted in 2003, 68 Fed. Reg. 55,139
(Sept. 22, 2003); and the Sacramento River Spring Run Chinook Salmon, 64 Fed. Reg. 50394 (Sept. 16, 1999).
The National Marine Fisheries Service ("NOAA Fisheries") has also listed the California Coastal Chinook
Salmon as a threatened species. NOAA Fisheries declined to list the Central Valley Fall Run Chinook Salmon
in 1999. 64 Fed. Reg. 50394 (Sept. 16, 1999).
141. 60 Fed. Reg. 4664 (1995).
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"fish and wildlife mitigation, protection, and restoration purposes," requires
the Bureau of Reclamation "to assist the State of California in its efforts to
protect the waters of the San Francisco Bay/Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta
Estuary," and mandates the annual dedication of 800,000 acre feet of project
yield to implement the environmental purposes of the statute;
142
(5) the 1994 Bay-Delta Accord which paved the way for long-term
accommodation of the competing interests in water supply and environmental
protection of the Bay-Delta ecosystem; 143
(6) California's ultimate resumption of authority in May 1995 to establish
and to implement water quality standards for the Bay-Delta ecosystem;
144
and
(7) the on-going CALFED process, the purpose of which is "to develop and
implement a long-term comprehensive plan that will restore ecological
health and improve water management for beneficial uses of the Bay-Delta
System.
' 45
The court of appeal's reiteration of the reasonable use and public trust
doctrines as limitations on the lawful exercise of water rights also profoundly
influenced the legal and political debate over the Bay-Delta. Its holding that the
SWRCB has the power to alter water rights based on findings that the "use and
diversion of the water [have] become unreasonable"' 146 because of their effects on
fish and wildlife, water quality, and other instream beneficial uses, put all users
on notice that their water rights were at some risk. This uncertainty played a key
role in the resolution (at least to date) of the Bay-Delta controversy.
Two participants in the negotiations that led up to the 1994 Bay-Delta Accord
confirm this thesis. 14 Each has written that the three major water use constituencies-
urban water supply agencies, agricultural users, and environmentalists-were
motivated to resolve their differences away from the SWRCB and the courts based on
their assessment of the risks to their future supplies and legal claims. 148 The urban
water supply agencies, led by the MWD, "realized that continued conflict over Delta
142. Pub. L. No. 102-575, 106 Stat. 4706, § 3406(a)-(b) (1992).
143. The 1994 Bay-Delta Accord, formally titled "Principles for Agreement on Bay-Delta Standards
Between the State of California and the Federal Government," is reproduced at 2 HASTINGS W.-Nw. J. ENVTL.
L. & POL'Y 97 (1995). The accord and the events leading up to it are described in David Fullerton, Summary
and Analysis: Principals for Agreement on Bay/Delta Standards Between the State of California and the
Federal Government as signed on December 15, 1994, 2 HASTINGS W.-Nw. J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 103 (1995),
and Elizabeth Ann Rieke, The Bay-Delta Accord. A Stride Toward Sustainability, 67 U. COLO. L. REV. 341
(1996).
144. See S.W.R.C.B., REVISED DECISION 1641 (Mar. 15, 2000).
145. CALFED BAY-DELTA PROGRAM, PROGRAMMATIC ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT/
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT REPORT, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 5 (July 2000).
146. United States v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 227 Cal. Rptr. 161, 187 (Ct. App. 1986).
147. See Fullerton, supra note 143; Rieke, supra note 143.
148. See Fullerton, supra note 143; Rieke, supra note 143.
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water use augured continued uncertainty for their water supplies. Instead of urging
delay, they sought resolution of the conflict. They did not have to be unduly threatened
or cajoled; they were ready to deal."'149 The agricultural water supply agencies had
conflicting positions, although each group was motivated by the uncertainties inherent
in the situation:
Upstream agriculture [users located in the Sacramento and San Joaquin
Valleys upstream of the Delta] had in the past, demanded that junior
users (e.g., the state and federal projects) bear the full burden of
protective standards. In practice, [however,] there was as significant
likelihood that the SWRCB, in its water rights process, would attempt to
reallocate some water from upstream users relying on the public trust
doctrine and other authorities. 5°
By contrast, "export agriculture [principally Central Valley Project and State
Water Project contractors located south of the Delta] was subject to the same
dynamics as the urban export agencies: without a settlement in the Delta, water
supply conditions would only get worse."'151 The final constituent group--the
participating environmental organizations-took advantage of the legal
uncertainties that were at play, but ultimately signed on to the compromise
embodied in the accord because of their fear that the law might change.
152
Specifically, they worried that the newly elected 104th Congress might amend
the Endangered Species Act, the Clean Water Act, and the CVPIA to remove the
federal mandates for greater protection of fisheries, water quality, and other
instream beneficial uses.
153
As with the conservation and reallocation of Colorado River water in the
IID-MWD and IID-San Diego transfers, the uncertainties at issue in the Bay-
Delta were an essential factor in bringing the parties to the negotiating table and
in inducing an agreement that ushered in a decade of water resources
management that has accommodated the competing interests reasonably well.
Although the CALFED Bay-Delta program remains a work-in-progress, the
reforms that have occurred since the Delta Water Cases decision in 1986 show
that legal and political uncertainties can have stabilizing effects as the various
water use constituencies decide (each for its own reasons) that compromise is
better than casting one's fate to the vicissitudes of administrative or judicial
evaluation of reasonable use and enforcement of the public trust in the state's
water resources.
149. Rieke, supra note 143, at 350.
150. Fullerton, supra note 143, at 110.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 109.
153. See id.; Rieke, supra note 143, at 365.
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C. Toward Greater Uncertainty of Water Rights?
The Colorado River and Delta controversies demonstrate that not all of the
uncertainties of California water rights law are pernicious. The uncertainties
fostered by the reasonable use and public trust doctrines have served as powerful
forces for reform. Although security of water rights is a factor that may influence
the willingness to hold or to transfer a water right, some beneficial uses and some
water transfers are the results of insecurity in the right. Water users such as liD
may be induced to incorporate conservation and transfer strategies into their
water management precisely because of the uncertain legality of their existing
water use practices. Presented with the risk of losing some of their rights for
waste or unreasonable use, water users rationally will choose to modernize their
practices to conform to the evolving standards of reasonable use by conserving
water or otherwise increasing the efficiency of their conveyance, management,
and use of water. If they can profit from these reforms by transferring the
conserved water, so much the better. In these situations, the water right holders
benefit by protecting and preserving their rights; the transferees of the conserved
water benefit by obtaining water at a lower cost than alternative sources; and the
public benefits from the improved efficiencies of water use and water allocation.
The Colorado River and Delta cases also show that the water rights system
can be administered in a manner that both fulfills California's economic demands
for consumptives uses of its waters and protects the ecosystems that are the
sources of the state's developed water supplies. The requirements of reasonable
use and consistency with the public trust are the essential means by which these
interests are accommodated. As California's economy evolves, as its
demographics change, as aggregate demands for water increase, as the available
sources of water supply become increasingly scarce, and as new laws (such as the
Endangered Species Act, the Clean Water Act, and the CVPIA) are enacted in
response to scientific developments and shifting public values, these doctrines
will make it possible for state and federal water administrators to ensure that the
exercise of existing water and contract rights continues to serve the contemporary
needs of society.
It would be a mistake to try to reduce or eliminate these salutary uncertainties
in California's water rights system. Despite the concerns of economists that
uncertainty may deter water transfers, 54 there is no evidence that any transfer
negotiation has foundered on the belief that the underlying water right or the
proposed transfer itself would be unreasonable or contrary to the public trust. To
the extent that questions of prior waste or unreasonable use might deter otherwise
beneficial water transfers, the legislature has enacted a series of statutes that all
but eliminate the risk of an unreasonable use determination in this context.'
55
154. See supra text accompanying note 116.
155. See CAL. WATER CODE §§ 1011-1017, 1244 (West 1971 & Supp. 2004).
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Moreover, the liD's transfers of conserved water to MWD and San Diego--
which likely would not have occurred were it not for the waste and unreasonable
use findings against the District-belie the contention that security of water
rights is an essential aspect of water transfer policy. Some water transfers are the
product of insecurity and the uncertainties that inhere in the doctrine of
reasonable use.
Nor would it be appropriate to alter the reasonable use or public trust
doctrines in response to claims that they undermine or distort the property right
in water. Reasonable use has been an integral component of water rights in
California since the earliest days of statehood, 156 and California has recognized
the public trust in the state's navigable waterways since the Gold Rush era.1
57
Today, as the California Supreme Court confirmed in National Audubon, both
doctrines rest under the umbrella of Article X, Section 2 of the California
Constitution. 158 Modern decisions such as the Delta Water Cases and subsequent
Bay-Delta developments, which hold water users to the limitations that inhere in
their water rights, are neither contrary to the property right in water nor unfair to
the water users who are asked to ensure that the exercise of their consumptive
rights remains in balance with the reasonable competing needs of the natural
environment from which they derive their water. The incidental uncertainties
created by the doctrine of reasonable use and the public trust are the means by
which the state exercises effective supervision over its water rights system and
maintains the appropriate (and ever-changing) balance between water rights and
water quality, consumptive uses and the environment, and private rights and the
public interest. All things considered, a little uncertainty is not such a bad thing.
VII. CONCLUSION
In retrospect, the Governor's Commission's recommendations to reform
California water rights law appear to have been relatively modest. The
Commission did not, for example, urge the legislature to amend the Water Code
to incorporate the public trust doctrine into the water rights system. Nor did it
propose-in contexts other than statutory adjudications-to integrate ground and
surface water rights. The Commission did not recommend the adoption of a fee
on water use. Nor did it promote the reallocation of water from existing
consumptive users to new purposes such as fisheries protection, water quality
improvement, preservation of wetlands, and habitat restoration.
But if the Commission's Final Report appears to be modest from today's
vantage point, it is only because of the myriad changes to the state's water laws
and water resources policy that have occurred in the intervening twenty-five
156. See Brian E. Gray, In Search of Bigfoot: The Common Law Origins of Article X, Section 2 of the
California Constitution, 17 HASTINGS CON. L.Q. 225 (1989).
157. See Dunning, supra note 99.
158. Nat'l Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709,725 (Cal. 1983).
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years. The Governor's Commission was at the vanguard of this revolution in
California water policy; and its Final Report was a catalyst for the legislature, the
California Supreme Court, and other policymakers. With this symposium, we
justly celebrate the Commission's members, their creative work, and their many
contributions to the modern era in California water law.

